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FOREWORD
In the first decade of the 21st century, few national security
challenges facing the United States are as vexing as that posed by
North Korea. North Korea is both a paradox and an enigma. It is a
paradox because on the one hand, by some measures it appears to be
a very powerful state—possessing the world’s fourth largest armed
forces, a sizeable arsenal of ballistic missiles, and a worrying nuclear
program—but on the other hand, it is an economic basket case in
terms of agricultural output, industrial production, and foreign
trade exports. North Korea is also an enigma because virtually every
aspect of the Pyongyang regime is mysterious and puzzling.
In short, North Korea is difficult for Americans to understand
and analyze. This difficulty begins with confusion about what kind
of political system North Korea has and what kind of man leads it.
In this monograph, Andrew Scobell explores Pyongyang’s political
dynamics and seeks to shed light on the political system of North
Korea and its leader. This monograph is the second in a series
titled “Demystifying North Korea” published by the Strategic
Studies Institute. Forthcoming monographs will examine the military,
economic dimensions, and future scenarios for North Korea.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
ANDREW SCOBELL is associate research professor at the Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; and adjunct professor
of political science at Dickinson College. Born and raised in Hong
Kong, he joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1999 and is the
institute’s specialist on Asia-Pacific security. Prior to his current
position, he taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky; and
Rutgers University, New Jersey. He is the author of China’s Use
of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), ten monographs and reports,
and some 20 articles in such journals as Armed Forces and Society,
Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Current History,
and Political Science Quarterly. He has also written a dozen book
chapters and edited or co-edited four conference volumes. Dr. Scobell
holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

iv

SUMMARY
Much hyperbole surrounds the political regime in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). Many analysts
argue that North Korea is a unique political system. What kind of
regime is the DPRK, and what kind of leader does it have?
A variety of labels are given to the North Korean regime. These
include likening the regime to an organized crime family and to
a corporatist organism. There are certainly merits to each of these
approaches, but each has its limitations. Pyongyang does share some
of the attributes of organized crime and certainly engages in criminal
activity in a systematic and calculating manner. This pattern of
illicit behavior includes the production and distribution of narcotics
as well as the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, cigarettes, and
pharmaceuticals. But the DPRK is more than a crime family—it
possesses a massive conventional military force as well as significant
strategic forces. Moreover, the regime continues to brainwash,
imprison, or starve North Koreans, inflicting untold misery and
death on its people. Corporatism, meanwhile, may provide insights
into certain aspects of the system, but its utility is limited by the
confusion that surrounds understanding of this concept.
Certainly North Korea is distinct politically, but it also has
significant commonalities with various regime types and authority
structures. Pyongyang is a highly centralized and militarized
bureaucratic regime organized around an all-powerful leader. This
monograph examines the leader and the system, and identifies the
regime type. The author contends that the North Korean political
system is best conceived as a totalitarian regime that, although
weakened, remains remarkably resilient. After analyzing the key
elements of totalitarianism, he argues that the system’s greatest test
will probably come after the death of Kim Jong Il.
While the totalitarian regime may not long survive Kim’s passing,
one cannot assume that the system will collapse. Rather, the end
of totalitarianism may simply mean that the DPRK will enter a
new “post-totalitarian” phase similar to the paths taken by other
communist systems such as the Soviet Union and China. While the



latter term may be a good fit to describe China’s political system in
the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, it seems inaccurate to
describe North Korea. North Korea has not undergone any process
of “de-Kimification”: Kim Il Sung remains a deity in 21st century
North Korea and criticism or reappraisal is unthinkable. Moreover,
no one has contemplated criticizing or challenging his legacy because,
by all accounts, he remains universally revered by DPRK citizens,
including defectors. Furthermore, any official reevaluation of Kim
Il Sung is extremely unlikely because the regime is currently led by
Kim’s son. The most accurate way to characterize North Korea today
is as an eroding totalitarian regime.
While totalitarianism is a powerful and intimidating system,
it places tremendous strain on a state and a society—demanding
constant activity and mobilization of personnel and exploitation
of resources. The costs of maintaining heightened ideological
indoctrination, an ever-vigilant coercive apparatus, and a large
national defense organization are high and ultimately debilitating. To
maintain this for decades results in fatigue and burnout. Eventually
leaders and followers reach a point where both are physically and
mentally exhausted, and the country’s infrastructure and resources
become devastated. North Korea’s elite and ordinary people appear
to be approaching this point. But this fatigue and burnout does not
appear to produce much in the way of protest or dissent, let alone
revolt; most likely the majority of people in North Korea are simply
too tired to do much more than focus their time and energy on
providing for the basic needs of their families.
An absolute dictator still rules the regime. While the regime
continues to hold a monopoly of the instruments of coercion,
there has been some slippage or erosion in the defining features
of totalitarianism. First of all, Kim Jong Il, although he is virtually
an absolute dictator, appears to take into account the opinions of
others the way his father did not. And ideology no longer appears
to be so focused on transforming the state and society and more
on the instrumental goals of economic recovery, development,
and firming up regime power. While a condition of terror remains
palpable, it is no longer all pervasive, and individuals are able to
navigate or circumvent the system without fearing that they face dire
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consequences. As a result of the shift in ideology and alleviation of
the climate of terror, the regime has become “corrupted” literally as
bribery is rampant, and figuratively as the regime seeks to preserve
its power and status. Meanwhile, the Stalinist centrally planned
economy has been seriously eroded, and the monopoly of mass
communication has loosened significantly. The regime has attempted
to repair the latter two elements, but it is not clear to what extent this
will be successful.
The regime appears to be stable and not on the brink of collapse.
While it is difficult to speculate about the longevity of North Korea
as a political entity, it is more manageable to forecast the future
of totalitarianism in the DPRK. Totalitarian regimes rarely endure
longer than several decades and almost never survive the passing
of the absolute dictator. In fact, Pyongyang is unique in that it is
the only totalitarian regime to weather a leadership transition (from
Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il). Indeed, North Korea is the world’s
“longest lasting totalitarian regime, having spanned some 4 decades
and surviving generational leadership succession.” Perhaps none of
the numerous challenges the regime faces is more daunting than the
succession question. Kim has probably at most 10-15 years in which
to pave the way for one of his offspring to succeed him. If he lives
long enough, it is possible he could be successful. What is less likely
is that totalitarianism could survive another leadership transition. At
some point, the totalitarian regime will simply collapse or weaken to
the extent that it becomes a post-totalitarianism system.
Possibly the clearest indication of the status and fate of Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime over the next 10 years or so will come in
how the arrangements for the succession to Kim Jong Il are handled.
Is there evidence that a particular individual is being groomed to
succeed Kim? The answer appears to be “yes.” Some other key
indicators to monitor are signs of dissent among elites and masses,
especially fissures that might occur within the party or military. By
carefully charting trends, observers can make it less likely that they
will be caught off guard by the actions of North Korea’s leader or
changes in its political system.
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KIM JONG IL AND NORTH KOREA:
THE LEADER AND THE SYSTEM
Much hyperbole surrounds the political regime in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Much of it focuses on North
Korea’s enigmatic dictator, Kim Jong Il, and his nuclear program.
Certainly, he has been the target of much derision and the butt of
many jokes because of his appearance, reclusiveness, and speculation
about his predilections. But the Pyongyang regime is more than
simply a garden variety dictator who happens to possess weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The DPRK is also a large bureaucratic and
organizational entity. This begs the question: What kind of regime is
the DPRK, and what kind of leader does it have?
Many analysts argue that North Korea is a unique political system.
Certainly, it is distinct politically to the extent that each country has
its own specific characteristics. But North Korea also has significant
commonalities with various regime types and authority structures.
Pyongyang is a highly centralized and militarized bureaucratic
regime organized around an all-powerful leader. This monograph
examines the leader and the system. The author identifies the regime
type and analyzes its key elements. He contends that North Korea’s
political system is best conceived of as a totalitarian regime that
although weakened, remains remarkably resilient. The monograph
argues that the greatest test that the system is likely to face will come
after the death of Kim Jong Il. While the totalitarian regime may not
long survive Kim’s passing, one cannot assume that the system will
collapse. Rather, the end of totalitarianism may simply mean that
the DPRK will enter a new “post-totalitarian” phase similar to the
paths taken by other communist systems such as the Soviet Union
and China following the passing of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong,
respectively.
A variety of labels are given to the North Korean regime,
including likening it to an organized crime family and to a
corporatist organism. North Korea also has been depicted as what
might be labeled “fragmented totalitarianism.”1 There are certainly
merits to each of these approaches, but each has its limitations.
Pyongyang shares some of the attributes of organized crime and


certainly engages in criminal activity in a systematic and calculating
manner. This pattern of illicit behavior includes the production and
distribution of narcotics, notably heroin and methamphetamines,
which reportedly provide hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars
worth of income to Pyongyang annually. In addition, North Korea
is known to engage in the counterfeiting of foreign currencies,
cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals.2 Nevertheless, Pyongyang is much
more than a variant of a crime family such as the fictional ones
depicted in the Mario Puzo’s The Godfather or Home Box Office’s The
Sopranos. For a start, neither Don Corleone nor Tony Soprano ran a
country about the size of Mississippi, controlled the world’s fourth
largest military, or could count on the powerful emotional appeal of
nationalism to the reinforce the ties of personal and familial loyalty
in their organizations (although ethnic loyalty certainly plays a role
for both fictional crime bosses).3 However, as analyst David Asher
states: “. . . North Korea has become a ‘soprano state’—a government
guided by a . . . leadership whose actions, attitudes, and affiliations
increasingly resemble those of an organized crime family more than
a normal nation.” Asher asserts that, as a result: “North Korea is the
only government in the world today that can be identified as being
actively involved in directing crime as a central part of its national
economic strategy and foreign policy.”4
Moreover, while corporatism may provide insights into certain
aspects of the system, its utility is limited by the confusion that
surrounds understanding of this concept.5
Finally, “fragmented totalitarianism” is a fuzzy term, but
“fragmented authoritarianism” does not seem to be much more
appropriate. The concept of “fragmented totalitarianism” is
problematic since it amounts to an oxymoron: if power is truly
fragmented in a regime, then it certainly does not qualify as totalitarian
(see Figure 1).6 A more useful term and concept, post-totalitarianism,
is discussed below.
While the latter term may be a good fit to describe China’s political
system in the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, it seems
inaccurate to describe North Korea that way.7 For one, North Korea
has not undergone any process of “de-Kimification” to parallel the
serious reassessment of Mao that China undertook in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, let alone the more thorough “De-Stalinization”


TOTALITARIANISM

POST-TOTALITARIANISM

1. Absolute dictator and ruling party
(monistic)

Dictator’s power weakens
(pluralism and dissent emerge)

2. Transformational  ideology
(totalist/utopian goals)

Instrumental ideology
(economic development and party rule)

3. Terror all-pervasive

Terror no longer pervasive

4. Monopoly of coercive apparatus

Monopoly maintained

5. Centrally planned economy

Eroded

6. Monopoly of mass communication

Eroded

note: Compiled by author.

Figure 1. Totalitarianism and Post-Totalitarianism.

spearheaded by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the mid-1950s.
Kim Il Sung remains a deity in 21st century North Korea and criticism
or reappraisal is unthinkable. Moreover, no one has contemplated
criticizing or challenging his legacy because, by all accounts, he
remains universally revered by DPRK citizens, including defectors.8
Furthermore, any official reevaluation of Kim Il Sung is extremely
unlikely because the regime is currently led by Kim’s son. I contend
that the most accurate way to characterize North Korea today is as
an eroding totalitarian regime.9
TOTALITARIANISM IN ONE FAMILY
The North Korean political system most closely approximates
totalitarianism.10 It possesses the six characteristics of totalitarianism
identified by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski half a century
ago. The DPRK has an absolute dictator and mass party, an elaborate
ideology, its people live in a condition of terror under the thumb of an
extremely repressive coercive apparatus with a centralized economy,
and the regime exerts almost total control over the mediums of mass
communication.11
A central element of the regime and the critical element of
the coercive apparatus is the military. North Korea’s military is


not examined in this monograph but will be the focus of the next
monograph in this series. Suffice it here to make two observations.
First, the DPRK is “undoubtedly the most militarized . . . [regime] on
earth.”12 Second, although communist regimes are typically dubbed
“party-states” (because the communist party and government
bureaucracies tend to be heavily intertwined or enmeshed), it is more
accurate to call these regimes “party-military-states” to underscore
the prominent role routinely played by the armed forces.13 In short,
the role of the military in North Korea is so important that it merits
a monograph devoted exclusively to the subject. The political
landscape of the DPRK is dominated by three massive bureaucratic
organizations (see Figure 2): “the Party” (the Korean Workers’ Party,
or KWP), “the State” (the DPRK), and “the Military” (the Korean
People’s Army, KPA, or Army).
Although the extreme degree of control and repression that existed
while Kim Il Sung was alive has weakened noticeably, today North
Korea remains a country where the regime seeks to control not only
what the populace does, but also what it thinks. However, the DPRK
has not evolved into post-totalitarianism yet. Post-totalitarianism
is markedly weaker than totalitarianism but still distinct from and
more powerful than authoritarianism (Figure 1).
Under post-totalitarianism, regime control loosens significantly
and the dictator’s power weakens, ideology ceases to be
“transformational” and terror is no longer all-pervasive, while
central planning and the monopoly of mass communication both
erode. But the coercive apparatus remains firmly in place.14 By this
yardstick, North Korea is not there just yet: Kim Jong Il may feel
that his power is not as absolute as his father’s and ideology may
be shifting from transformational to instrumental, but the DPRK
has not entered post-totalitarianism. The regime leadership has yet
to shift its ideological emphasis from “utopia” to “development.”15
Pluralism and dissent have not yet emerged (although these
manifestations may not be so far off) and the coercive apparatus still
seems largely effective (with some exceptions), but a condition of
terror appears to be rather less pervasive. One clear manifestation
of these changes is that Pyongyang is no longer capable of
preventing migration within the country or out migration to China
by hungry or starving people. It is estimated that hundreds of
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thousands of North Koreans have traversed the country in search
of food and 100,000 or more people have sought at least temporary
refuge in China. Moreover, thousands have attempted to defect,
mostly via China.16 While North Korea’s centrally planned economy
has eroded considerably over the past decade or so, it remains alive
and the regime appears to be in the process of reactivating it (see
below). The DPRK’s monopoly of mass communication has also
been under assault, but the regime has been fighting back with some
success.
Absolute Dictator and Mass Party.
Kim Jong Il appears very much in control of North Korea. While
there have been periodic reports since Kim Il Sung’s death in July
1994 that the younger Kim’s power and influence were eroding,
there is no firm indication that this was or is the case. In late 2004,
for example, speculation was rampant about the reason behind the
removal of many public portraits of Kim Jong Il. Did this mean a
scaling back of the cult of personality or possibly that a power
struggle was underway?17 Many reporters and analysts overlooked
a more mundane explanation: that the portraits may have been taken
down for cleaning or updating.18
According to those who have first-hand experience dealing
with Kim Jong Il, he seems to be in firm control of North Korea.
Madeleine Albright reported that Kim answered 14 questions on
North Korea’s missile program posed by the Clinton administration
in her presence by himself without once “consulting the expert by
his side.”19 Moreover, Hwang Jong Yop, the highest level defector
from Pyongyang who had many years to observe Kim’s behavior
and grasp the structure of power in North Korea, stated: “Who is in
charge? No one [else] has real power. . . . Only Kim Jong Il has real
power. . . .”20
Kim Jong Il did engage in a decades-long effort to claim his
father’s mantle, and the dynastic transition from Kim the father to
Kim the son seems to have been quite smooth.21 This is not altogether
surprising, given that the elder Kim began making preparations
for the hereditary succession as early as 1972 and the younger Kim
spent at least 22 years as an “understudy.”22 The younger Kim’s rare


appearances and apparent reluctance to speak in public perhaps
reflect a combination of the so-called “successor’s dilemma” and
a desire to project appropriate Confucian deference for a father by
his son rather than shyness or a dislike of being on display.23 The
dilemma means that while the heir apparent tries to prepare for the
day when he/she will assume the top position of leadership, he/
she is careful not to overshadow or antagonize the older leader and
remain sufficiently deferential. This dynamic has proved challenging
for leadership successions in other communist systems such as
China.24 In the case of North Korea, successor Kim seemed very
adept at handling this dilemma. According to Dae Sook Suh: “Kim
Jong Il was careful not to upstage his father.”25 The younger Kim
skillfully followed his “survival strategy.”26
Kim Jong Il: The Hardest Working Man in Show Business. Perceptions
of Kim Jong Il have undergone a metamorphosis from the image of
a reclusive playboy to that of a driven dictator. Rumors abounded
about his drinking, womanizing, and penchant for fast cars. But
in recent years, Kim has undergone a dramatic public relations
makeover, becoming a personable and engaging tyrant: a thinking
man, well-informed, with a hands-on leadership style.27
He proved a gracious host to Republic of Korea President Kim
Dae Jung in mid-2000 and several months later to then Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright when each visited Pyongyang. Visitors
invariably remark on the charm and conversation skills of their North
Korean host. Albright reports that her meetings with Kim in late2000 confirmed reports from Chinese, Russian, and South Korean
sources that he was “knowledgeable, good humored, and relatively
normal.” The former Secretary of State, who had the opportunity to
engage in extended discussions with the dictator and observe her
host’s behavior during a 2-day visit to Pyongyang, remarked that,
while Kim was “isolated, [he was] not uninformed,” and impressed
her as “an intelligent man who knew what he wanted.”28
So what does Kim Jong Il want?29 Kim appears to have big plans
for his country: he apparently has a vision of North Korea becoming
a high technology Mecca: he visited China’s Silicon Valley on the
outskirts of Beijing in 2001. His most senior military leader, Marshal
Jo Myon Rok, visited the original Silicon Valley in 2000 during a brief
California stopover on the return leg of his trip to meet President Bill


Clinton in the White House. Kim reportedly keeps well-informed
by watching Cable News Network and surfing the worldwide web.
For some reason, he asked Madeleine Albright for the address of the
Department of State’s website.30
The key events in his metamorphosis from reclusive playboy
to driven dictator occurred in 2000: the summit he held with
President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea in Pyongyang in
mid-June and the late October visit to North Korea of Secretary of
State Albright. The most impressive performance was his gracious
hosting of the inter-Korea summit in June 2000: what I call “Kim
Jong Il’s coming out party.” President Kim traveled to Pyongyang
for an historic meeting between the leaders of two Koreas. The North
Korean leader displayed a confident, rational, and amicable public
persona that shattered the prevailing image of him as a reclusive and
manic eccentric.31 This impressive public relations effort to promote
a certain image to the North Korea people, to South Korea (Kim was
appropriately deferential to his older guest from Seoul), and the
world probably makes Kim worthy of the label “the hardest working
man in show business.”
In a very real sense, Kim Jong Il is engaged in the essence of
show business: writing scripts, directing casts, building sets, and
playing the leading roles himself in major cinematic and theatrical
productions. All of this is done in order to project an image and a
storyline—a version of “reality”—that is believable, credible, and
appealing to his foreign and/or domestic audiences. Kim appears
to be the producer, director, and leading man in his own feature
film.32 The epic is without parallel in terms of the scope, expense, and
sustained effort that goes into production. By most accounts, Kim
has a long held fascination with movie making. His first post of any
real responsibility under his father was in charge of propaganda (See
Figure 3). In this position he oversaw the production of movies.33
His determination to produce quality full length feature films drove
him to arrange the kidnapping of renowned South Korean movie
director Shin Sang Ok and his actress ex-wife Choi Eun Hee in 1978.
He reportedly has a huge film collection and by his own admission
regularly watches foreign movies.34 Kim also takes an interest in
entertainment/propaganda extravaganzas. He told Albright that he
choreographed the Las Vegas-style showgirl stage show provided


as after dinner entertainment for the visiting chief U.S. diplomat.35
Kim probably also had a major hand in designing the massive
Nuremburg-style rally at the stadium that Albright witnessed the
day before.
1941: Kim Jong Il born in Soviet Far East and lives there in early years of life
1949: Mother dies
1950-52: Lives in China during Korean War
1959: Visits Moscow with his father
1964: Graduates from Kim Il Sung University and becomes #2 official in Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP) Propaganda Department
1972: Designated as successor by father
1973: Appointed to direct KWP’s Organization Department
1980: Appointed to KWP’s Politburo and to 2nd ranking position on KWP’s
Military Commission
1983: Visits China
1992: Promoted to Marshal and supreme commander of Korean People’s Army
1993: Appointed chair of National Defense Council
1994: Kim Il Sung dies
1997: Becomes Chair of the KWP
2000: Visits China (May), holds summit with South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung (June), hosts visits by Russian President Putin (July) and U.S.
Secretary of State Albright (October)
2001: Visits China (January) and Russia (July-August) and hosts visit by Chinese
leader Jiang Zemin (September)
2002: Visits Russia (August), and hosts visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
(September)
2004: Visits China (April), and hosts visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi (May)
2005: Hosts President Hu Jintao of China (October)
2006: Visits China (January)
NOTE: Compiled by author from numerous sources.

Figure 3. A Kim Jong Il Timeline.

Kim also appears to be very engaged in ruling North Korea—
constantly issuing directives and making telephone calls.36 He
probably adopted these micromanagement tendencies from his
father.37 One recent assessment of Kim Jong Il described him as
“Jimmy Carter on an authoritarian tear.”38 This parallel with Jimmy
Carter may actually be both an accurate and appropriate one,
although not in the flippant way that the author had intended: the
characterization appears intended to reassure readers. Whereas on


the face of it, this appears to put Kim in a somewhat positive light,
delving more into the implications of this depiction puts a more
disconcerting and even alarming spin on it.
Former president Jimmy Carter is without a doubt an extremely
bright man, a dedicated public servant, and an outstanding
humanitarian. Arguably, however, these fine attributes did not
make him the most effective president.39 Carter had a reputation,
perhaps undeserved, as a micro manager who, unwilling to delegate,
immersed himself in mastering the details and minutiae of an issue.40
Moreover, according to some accounts, Carter was also, belying
his “aw shucks” easy-going common man persona, “[a] man of
abundant self-confidence in his own abilities. . . .” At the very least,
according to one presidential scholar: “Carter [had] acquired or let
show a high degree of arrogance [as president-elect] . . . and during
the early months of his presidency.”41
If the parallel between Carter and Kim in this regard is even
partially appropriate or accurate, this is a frightening and even
terrifying thought: a Carteresque leader in Pyongyang, but without
any of the Georgian’s moral scruples, who operates in a system
devoid of any democratic checks and balances. Surrounded and
advised by sycophants, it is highly unlikely that Kim gets the kind of
truthful reporting he desperately needs to make the best decisions.
The North Korean leader is probably aware of this problem and tries
to compensate by adopting a variety of means. These include his
own informal network of informers around the country who report
“directly to his office,”42 and his well-known habit of visiting locales
for impromptu “on-the-spot-guidance” appearances. While these
efforts may help mitigate the problem, they have their limits and
could even exacerbate it in some ways.
In his appearances around the country, it may not be so easy for
Kim Jong Il to counter the “Potemkin Village effect.” A Potemkin
Village is a false construct intended to fool a visiting leader or
dignitary by portraying a picturesque or idyllic setting of a village,
farm, factory, or military unit to mask a far less pleasant reality.43
There is a long history in communist regimes and dictatorships
generally of parading dignitaries through specially constructed
showpieces. Even savvy dictators, including Mao Zedong, have
been fooled by these efforts, so it is very likely that Kim Jong Il and
10

his father have been fooled also.44 The North Korean capital city of
Pyongyang might be best categorized as a “Potemkin City” where
nothing is as it seems.45 Journalist and author Bradley Martin writes
that he strongly suspected that the full-time jobs of some North
Korean citizens are riding the subways all day. The purpose of this is
to give the impression of a modern, efficient, and dynamic city.46 The
same may be true of a showpiece hospital on the itinerary for foreign
visitors to Pyongyang.47 It is not clear if Kim Jong Il succumbs to the
deceptions of his own regime.
A Rational Leader. However quirky Kim Jong Il is, he is not crazy.
He is quite rational, although his calculus of rationality is probably
“bounded” by the specific context of his North Korea environment
and his (mis)perceptions of the conditions inside and outside his
country.48 In other words, Kim seems to make decisions based on
his own evaluation of reality, although his assessment of reality and
decisionmaking calculus are distinct and limited by his own experience
and exposure to the outside world. The preceding paragraph has
discussed the North Korean dictator’s state of knowledge about the
situation inside his own country. What about his level of knowledge
and understanding about the world beyond its borders?
While Kim has made visits overseas, with the exception of
childhood sojourns in the Soviet Far East (where he was born) and
China (for about 2 years during the Korea War), these have been
few, brief, and limited to a handful of countries. In 1957 Kim visited
Moscow with his father, and 2 years later he accompanied his father
to Eastern European capitals. The Younger Kim has made at least two
further visits to Russia (in 2001 and 2002), and at least five visits to
China (in 1983, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2006).49 During visits to Russia
and China, most of the time Kim remained inside a cocoon—a train
specially fitted with all the comforts and security of home.50 Kim has
hinted that he has made secret trips to other countries, including
Indonesia.51 Other than through actual visits, his information and
impressions of other countries and cultures are likely gleaned from
movies, the internet, and satellite television.52 But even granting
that Kim has done more traveling overseas than we are aware
of, the question remains why he has not done so more often and
publicly. He may not enjoy traveling, especially air travel (he has a
strong preference for train travel), he may not like to be out of the
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country for too long (either because of his need to micromanage, or
out of concern that a power vacuum might develop or be filled in
his absence). Another reason might be that he feels uncomfortable
venturing outside of the world’s largest film set where stage effects
are out of his control.
Why has he yet to visit Seoul more than 5 years after he accepted
Republic of Korea (ROK) President Kim Dae Jung’s invitation to go
south “at an appropriate time in the future”? Why has he not visited
the United States or even expressed an interest in going? The answer
to these questions might be that he fears for his safety.53 Kim is very
likely concerned about the threat of assassination. This may explain
why he insists on secrecy regarding his trips both at home and abroad.
Another answer might be that he believes he has nothing to gain from
such trips. Kim Dae Jung has noted that the most controversial part
of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the inter-Korean
summit of June 2000 was the sentence mentioning that Kim Jong
Il expressed a willingness to visit Seoul. The North Korean leader
reportedly told his South Korean counterpart that there were people
in North Korea who would strongly oppose such a trip.54 Another
reason for his reluctance to visit Seoul or Washington might be that,
in East Asian cultures, it is usually subordinate leaders that travel to
visit their superiors and not the other way around.55 Thus, visitors
to Pyongyang appear to be supplicants to the Dear Leader whereas
when Kim visits other capitals, he can be can be cast in the role of
supplicant. This may help explain why Kim insists on considerable
secrecy and a media blackout of his activities when he travels
abroad.
In my view, the only way one can conclude Kim Jong Il is “crazy”
or a “madman” is if we fall into the trap of mirror imaging and assume
that a political leader in Pyongyang thinks like a political leader in
Washington or London. While Kim may not necessarily appear to be
always acting rationally on the world stage, he is acting rationally
within the context of the North Korean political system and his own
frame of reference. Of course, all national leaders operate in at least
two arenas; that of domestic politics and that of international politics.
Kim is no exception in playing two-level games.
But this begs the question: If the North Korean leader was indeed
crazy, how would one know it? If one makes the presumption that
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Kim Jong Il is the key decisionmaker in Pyongyang, then one assumes
that the decisions the regime executes are his. If we consider regime
decisions since at least the death of Kim Il Sung in mid-1994, the
record is quite impressive. Kim Jong Il has managed to complete a
successful leadership succession and stay in power for more than
a decade; he has maintained his regime, and in the process ridden
out a severe famine and managed (but certainly far from resolved)
a systemic economic crisis; and he has adeptly juggled his country’s
relations with neighboring countries and great powers, most notably
the United States, while extracting cash and various forms of aid,
including food and fuel, without having to make much in the way
of concrete concessions in return. In short, dealt an extremely weak
hand of cards, Kim has proved to be an extremely skillful poker
player.
Finally, before putting the issue of Kim’s rationality to rest, it may
be instructive to compare Kim to other absolute dictators from the
tyrant hall of infamy who ruled totalitarian regimes. If Kim is crazy,
he is crazy the way Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong were crazy—“like
a fox”!56 The North Korean leader is skilled at manipulating and
controlling people. It would be a mistake to dismiss Kim’s drinking
parties as simply evidence of his debauchery and excesses. Rather,
as former Pyongyang insider Hwang Jong Yop incisively observes,
these occasions should be seen as “an important element of Kim Jong
Il’s style of politics.” These events provide important opportunities
for him to reaffirm his status and authority over key subordinates
and promote a sense of loyalty and camaraderie among his core
supporters.57 These functions provide a way for attendees to verify
that they are regime insiders—in essence the Dear Leader’s anointed
few. These drinking parties are similar to the types of male bonding
activities hosted by government and business leaders in other East
Asian countries, including Japan and South Korea, to cement and
maintain relationships in the workplace.58
Kim also deliberately tries to keep people off balance and guessing
about his next move. These efforts are all aimed at making him
appear formidable and even dangerous. Kim reportedly remarked:
“We must create an environment as if surrounded by fog so our
enemies cannot see us directly and clearly.”59 Kim Jong Il, like the
deceased leaders of the former Soviet Union and China, appears
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to be a master of political survival: despite famines and various
crises—foreign and domestic—he remains in power. And like Stalin
and Mao, he has been quite successful at developing a nuclear
weapons program (building, of course, upon his father’s efforts).60
But Kim does not appear to be crazy in the self-destructive way that,
say Hitler, proved to be. The Nazi leader proved far less adept at
knowing his limitations and limitations of German national power
than the infamous above-mentioned communist Soviet and Chinese
dictators, both of whom died in their beds of natural causes with
their regimes intact. Kim might well possess most, if not all, of the
core characteristics of “malignant narcissism.” However, this does
not necessarily mean that such a personality disorder will prove
fatal.61
Kim appears eccentric, egotistical, ruthless, and extremely
ambitious.62 His peculiar tastes in Western fashion and fascination
with show business and the arts make for an odd mix. Observers
often comment on his penchant for platform shoes and bouffant hair
styles, almost certainly intended to make him appear taller that his
five foot-two inch stature.63
Kim is also egotistical, appearing to subscribe to Louis XIV’s
dictum: “I am the state” [L’ etat c’est moi.]. In short, he believes that he
personifies North Korea and, by extension, the hopes and aspirations
of the entire Korean people. And following this, he believes that he
should be succeeded by one of his own offspring. Kim is also, in
the words of Bradley Martin, an “insensitive and brutal despot.”64
He has ruthlessly purged those whom he deems to be disloyal or
competitors, retains a vast gulag system, and seems unmoved by the
mass starvation and continued malnourishment of his people. Finally,
he appears to be extremely ambitious and relatively unfazed by the
significant setbacks his regime has experienced over the past 15 years.
He continues to believe that his regime can survive and recover from
its ordeals. He seems to believe that North Korea should continue
to have a “civilian” nuclear program at least as much out a matter
of national pride and prestige as for purposes of energy security.
In Kim’s mind, all advanced countries—including Japan and South
Korea—have nuclear power, at least for peaceful purposes. Since the
DPRK is an advanced country and a major power, it stands to reason
that North Korea must possess a nuclear power industry.
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There is perhaps no better gauge of Kim’s confidence in the
continuation of the regime than indications of plans and preparations
for a dynastic succession. Kim has at least three sons and two
daughters (born to three different mothers) to select from to succeed
him as the leader of the regime: an eldest son born in 1971, two other
sons born in 1981 and 1983, and two daughters, one born in 1974 and
another born in 1987 (see Figure 4). While it does appear that Kim is
preparing the way for one of his offspring to succeed him, it is not
yet clear which one has been anointed. Speculation about the most
likely candidate abounds, especially after an October 2, 2002, essay
appeared in the Nodong Shinmun, the official newspaper of the KWP,
seemed intended to pave the way. The essay claimed: “Already a
long time ago, the late Kim Il Sung expressed his determination to
win the final victory of the Korean revolution by his son, if not by
himself, or by his grandson, if not by his son. President Kim Il Sung
reportedly expressed this determination at the secret camp on Mount
Paektu in the spring of 1943.”65
As paramount leader, Kim Jong Il is virtually an absolute dictator,
but he does not appear to be worshiped like his father was. Defectors
invariably say while they admired and revered Kim Il Sung, they
are indifferent or even contemptuous of Kim Jong Il.66 Thus the
charismatic legitimacy of the younger Kim seems to be minimal, if not
nonexistent. But for the time being, this seems to be more than offset
by the traditional and, perhaps, to a lesser extent the rational-legal
basis of his authority to rule North Korea (the traditional dimensions
of Kim’s legitimacy are discussed in more detail below in the section
on ideology).
This discussion raises questions about the likelihood of Kim
Jong Il being able to engineer successfully a hereditary succession.
Leadership succession has been an insurmountable obstacle for
totalitarian regimes and an enormous challenge for communist
political systems. North Korea is remarkable as the sole exception:
the only totalitarian regime to survive a succession.67 Therefore, while
the chances of a successful dynastic succession occurring in the 21st
century North Korea may be daunting, the possibility should not be
dismissed out of hand.68 Indeed, in late 2005 there was considerable
speculation that Kim Jong Il is grooming his second eldest son, Kim
Jong Chol, as his successor (Figure 4). Recent indications of this
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(d. 2002)

NOTE: Compiled by author.

b = born
d = died
(f) = female

Kim Jong Un
(b. 1983)

Kim Jong Chol
(b. 1981)

(b. 1974)

Figure 4. The Kim Family.

(b.1971)			

Kim Sol Song (f)

[3] Ko Yong Hui (f)

Kim Kyong Hui (f) = Chang Song Taek

[2] Kim Yong Suk (f)

(d. 1949)

Kim Jong Nam = Shin Jonh Hui (f)

(b. 1942?)

Kim Jong Il = [1] Song Hye Rim (f)

(1911-1994)

Kim Il Sung = Kim Jong Suk (f)

(b. 1987)

Name Unknown (f)

• Song Hye Rim: mother of Kim Jong Il’s eldest son, Jong Nam. A North
Korean actress and estranged from Kim Jong Il. Lived in Moscow until her
death in 2002.
• Kim Yong Suk: mother of Kim Jong Il’s favorite daughter, Sol Song.
• Ko Yong Hui: mother of three of Kim Jong Il’s three children: Jong Chol,
Jong Un and a daughter.
• Kim Jong Nam: eldest son of Kim Jong Il. Jong Nam studied in Moscow and Geneva. He reportedly speaks French, English, and Russian.
Believed to travel abroad frequently under assumed names, he was
deported from Japan in 2001 when he was discovered to be traveling on
a forged Dominican Republic passport. He is believed to be married with
a young son. A possible candidate to succeed his father.
• Kim Jong Chol: second oldest son of Kim Jong Il. Jong Chol reportedly
studied in Europe and is believed to be working in the Propaganda
Department of the Korean Workers’ Party. A possible candidate to succeed his father.
• Kim Jong Un: youngest son of Kim Jong Il. Little is known about him.
• Name Unknown: daughter of Kim Jong Il, and sister of Jong Chol and
Jong Un.
• Kim Sol Song: favorite daughter of Kim Jong Il. Sol Song followed in her
father’s footsteps, studied political economy at Kim Il Sung University.
She has accompanied her father on inspection tours in North Korea.
Source: Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, chapter 37.

Figure 4. The Kim Family (concluded).
include the purported creation in 2004, of two new offices in the
KWP to promote and prepare the 20-something youngster for his
future role and rumors that Jong Chol was introduced to visiting
Chinese President Hu Jintao during the latter’s visit to Pyongyang
in October 2005.69
The Korean Workers’ Party. Officially founded on October 10,
1945, the KWP is formally the ruling party of the DPRK. Perhaps a
more significant date might be August 29, 1946, when the Korean
Communist Party-North Korean Bureau, led by Kim Il Sung and the
New People’s Party under Kim Tu Bong merged to form the KWP.
According to historian Charles Armstrong, the new entity, numbering
several hundred thousand members, “immediately embarked on an
energetic program of recruitment and organizational growth.”70 The
17

KWP began as a classic Leninist party that adheres to the cardinal
principle of democratic centralism. In theory, this principle means
that debate and discussion are permitted, but once the top leadership
makes a decision, then everyone must observe iron discipline and
follow the party line. This principle is intended to ensure strong party
unity. The KWP itself is supposed to be governed by a Political Bureau
(or Politburo) that is formally elected by a Central Committee which,
in turn, has been formally elected by a Party Congress. Delegates to
a congress are supposed to have been elected by party cells.
The reality is somewhat different, as the top party leaders
tend to rule in an extremely authoritarian style. Senior leaders
select supporters to fill positions in these lower organs, and these
supporters, in turn, vote for the leaders who selected them. Hence
this power structure is dubbed the “circular flow of power.”71 And in
the early decades of communist rule, a single leader tends to assume
total control of the entire party, and therefore the state and society,
and brook no dissent or opposition either inside or outside the party.
Communist leaders have taken seriously the belief that the ruling
party serves as a “dictatorship of the proletariat” as they go about
the serious business of “building socialism.” What this has meant in
practice is the construction of a powerful and centralized party-state,
focusing in particular on a crash program of heavy industrialization
and equipping a sizeable and heavily armed military as rapidly as
possible. This political structure became known as a Leninist party
system after the first leader to construct and control the Bolshevik
prototype establishment in the Soviet Union—Vladimir I. Lenin.
In the case of North Korea, the KWP regime was initially installed
in 1945 and controlled by the Soviets for some 5 years.72 While Soviet
occupation forces withdrew in 1947-48, in mid-June 1950, on the
eve of the Korean War, there were reportedly “as many as 4,000
advisors” in Pyongyang.73 The leader that gradually emerged as
the most important figure (and the one that the Soviets accepted)
was Kim Il Sung.74 Kim soon proved himself to be a quick study.
Not only was he eager to amass the total power of the party in
his own hands, but he was keen to establish the credentials of the
DPRK as an indigenous Korean communist regime independent of
foreign control or domination. After a period of Soviet tutelage, Kim
launched himself and his regime onto a more autonomous trajectory,
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seeking to free the KWP from Soviet and Chinese domination. But
this did not mean he shunned Soviet and Chinese assistance. In
Kim’s attempt to reunify the peninsula through military force, he
received considerable numbers of men, arms, and equipment from
both Moscow and Beijing.75
Different factions used the 1950-1953 Korean War as an opportunity to undermine each other. Kim relied heavily on his partisan
faction—the close knit group of some 300 guerrilla fighters who had
served together in Manchuria.76 The domestic faction, which hailed
from South Korea, was blamed for the military setbacks and political
failure to unify the peninsula. The indigenous Korean communist
group was accused of plotting a coup against Kim Il Sung during
the Korean War. Twelve individuals were charged in July 1953 and
convicted the following month. Ten of them were sentenced to death,
with the remaining two receiving long prison terms. The purported
instigator, Pak Hon Yong, was not put on trial until after the war
in 1955, sentenced to death, and then executed.77 Kim also loosened
ties with the Soviet Union and gradually weakened the power of the
Soviet Korean Faction by purging its senior leader, Ho Kai, although
he retained other members of the group. Ho was expelled from the
KWP in November 1951, and reportedly committed suicide in August
1953.78 By 1958 Kim had purged the leadership of the so-called Yanan
Faction (including senior leader Kim Tu Bong) composed of those
who had worked or fought with the Chinese Communist Party or its
military forces.79
As a result of these successive purges, by time of the KWP’s
Fourth Party Congress, held in September 1961, Kim Il Sung had
become the absolute dictator of North Korea. According to Kim
Il Sung’s biographer, Dae-sook Suh: “His [Kim’s] long struggle to
consolidate power was complete. . . . There were no longer any
factions to challenge his position, and for the first time no foreign
armed forces were occupying the North.”80 In the process, Kim played
up the nationalist freedom fighter credentials of his own faction of
the communist movement and conveniently minimized the varied
backgrounds and noteworthy contributions of other factions and
leaders. Kim also ignored or downplayed the contributions of the
Soviet Union and China prior to and during the Korean War. Through
a process of complete “indigenization,” the Pyongyang regime
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became an entity autonomous of both Moscow and Beijing. Save for
the first years of occupation by the Red Army, North Korea could
never be accurately described as a “Soviet satellite” the way many
of the countries of East Europe were.81 North Korean history books
were written in such a way as to completely ignore the liberation of
northern Korea by the Soviet Red Army and its installation of the
regime.
KWP congresses and plenums became less and less frequent, and
their deliberations less and less substantive. Part of the reason for the
“subservience” of the delegates appears to be the significant turnover
between congresses: between 41 and 72 percent of the members of
Central Committees selected at each party congress were new to their
positions.82 The last full party congress to be held when Kim Il Sung
was alive was in 1980. Significantly, the main purpose of Sixth Party
Congress appeared to have been to give clear but veiled notice to the
KWP membership of Kim Jong Il’s status as his father’s heir. The son
was appointed to the Politburo, its Presidium, and he became the
second ranking member of the party’s Military Commission.83
Is the Party Over? Indeed, no new party congress has been held
since Kim Il Sung’s death. Since a congress has not occurred in 35
years and other KWP meetings seem to be few and far between,
the question must be asked whether the party has ceased to be the
leading organization in North Korea. While the KWP may no longer
be the dominant organizational entity in North Korea, it is certainly
not irrelevant (although the Party Congress appears to be dormant—
see Figure 2). Part of the explanation may lie in a dictator’s efforts to
play bureaucratic games to keep the reins of power concentrated in
his hands and ensure no challenger emerges. Many dictators have
shifted the prime bureaucratic entity through which they exert
control and rule of their country to avoid power accumulating in
any one place. Moreover, in totalitarian regimes, this shift may be
pursued because of the need to reenergize the system by focusing on
what is perceived to be a more dynamic bureaucracy. Then, in the
1970s, for example, Kim Il Sung appears to have shifted his focus for
ruling North Korea from the party to the state apparatus.84 Similarly,
at various times Kim the father and Kim the son have chosen to
emphasize the role of the military at the expense of the party and the
state bureaucracies: in the 1960s, Kim Il Sung increased the power of
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the KPA; then in the late 1990s, Kim Jong Il raised the profile of the
military again.85 China’s Mao Zedong tried similar moves during the
Cultural Revolution, turning to students to reenergize the Chinese
Communist Party. Then, in the late 1960s, when the youthful Red
Guards proved uncontrollable and unruly, Mao turned to the armed
forces to restore order and run the country.
Since his father’s death, Kim Jong Il appears to have relied more
on other bureaucratic organs and organizations, most notably the
National Defense Commission and the KPA. These organizations
will be discussed briefly below in the “Coercive Apparatus” section
and in greater detail in a subsequent monograph. This raises a
question: Why did the Kims (father and son) find it more convenient
to circumvent the KWP? The Elder Kim may simply have found it
too bothersome and irrelevant to the business of ruling North Korea.
The Younger Kim may have drawn the same conclusion. But there
might be more to it than this as far as Kim Jong Il is concerned. From
the 1960s until Kim Il Sung’s death, there does not appear to have
been much discernible dissent or autonomous activity. In the era of
Kim Jong Il, however, at least some limited dissent or autonomous
society activity has emerged. This is relatively modest at the elite and
mass levels. Within the regime itself, there appears to be some degree
of dissent, but these accounts are sketchy, unreliable, and impossible
to confirm. The best evidence of actual elite dissent is the defections
of the past decade or so. However, many of these defectors flee to
escape imminent punishment for misdeeds, or because they believe
they have fallen from favor and are about to be purged. Ordinary
North Koreans have engaged in sporadic dissent expressed in
leaflets, posters, and orally in at least some areas of the country.86
It is possible that one reason behind the younger Kim’s preference
for not ruling directly through the KWP bureaucracy is that there is
some degree of questioning of or quibbling with the younger Kim
from the “party faithful,” or at least that Kim believes this might be
so.
Things have changed since the early 1990s: defections of elite
and ordinary North Koreans have risen significantly. In the 1990s,
defections to South Korea hovered around 100 per year, but by 2000
and 2001 the numbers of defectors had shot up into the hundreds.87
The most senior defector was Hwang Jong Yop, who was a key
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advisor and interpreter of ideology; other senior officials included
both diplomats and soldiers.
The party and its nucleus of elites remains a sizeable and
significant entity that Kim cannot ignore. A total KWP membership
of some three million—dominated by an apparatchik elite numbering
approximately several hundred thousand—support the system
because they directly owe their jobs, status, and livelihood to the
perpetuation of the regime. With the regime’s demise, they would
lose their power, privilege, and hence be unable to provide for their
families. As one defector told journalist and author Bradley Martin:
“In my case, if you asked for one big reason I defected, I would answer:
Beijing exposed me to unlimiited [sic] outside information. I realized
that if unification came, it would be by North Korean collapse or
absorption into South Korea, I would become unemployed. . . .”88
Moreover, fear of retribution or persecution for crimes and misdeeds
by the regime must be high among elites. The fear that they will
be held accountable for the torture and executions, not to mention
other horrors that will only come to light after the regime collapses,
is understandable and serves as a powerful motivator to maintain
their support for the regime.89 To sum up, most elites continue to
see their fates as being intertwined with that of the regime. If these
elites did start to waver, then the regime would be in very serious
trouble.
Some analysts and observers claim that Kim Jong Il’s power
is not absolute and identify the existence of various factions or
bureaucratic groupings. Some, such as Selig Harrison, insist there are
hardliners and reformers;90 others, notably Daniel Pinkston, discuss
differences based upon presumed institutional interests and talk
about “bureaucratic stakeholders.”91 Certainly, this is what North
Korean officials from Kim Jong Il on down tell foreign interlocutors.
But other respected analysts discern no evidence of significant
pluralism.
One should ask why Kim and other officials feel the need to tell
foreigners about the existence of internal opinion or bureaucratic
interest groups. They could be telling the truth, or they could be trying
to deliberately mislead. In either case, what would be the benefit
of “revealing” this information to foreigners? If it is true, it helps
them to account for the zigs and zags or contradictory impulses that
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Pyongyang exhibits. If it is disinformation, it serves as a convenient
way for these officials to justify Pyongyang’s hardline, adamant,
and the jerky progress on reform and other issues. It allows leaders
from Kim Jong Il on down to do what they feel they must do while
blaming others. In short, Kim and other savvy officials who meet with
foreigners get to avoid being seen as the bad guys. But whatever the
truth of the matter—and it probably lies somewhere in between—
what these tales of differences of opinion within Pyongyang’s elite
circles suggest to this writer is that the structure of power may be
changing.
Why do I speculate along these lines? In most communist regimes,
officials tend to insist that there is complete unity within the party even
when there is obviously not. It is important in communist political
cultures to maintain the outward appearance of unity even if this is
fiction. Of course, these North Korean tales of Pyongyang opinion
groupings are not broadcast in official public pronouncements
but rather in informal and ostensibly off-the-record conversations
between elites and foreign leaders and interlocutors. But the fact
that these leaders feel the need to say this in any venue suggests this
contains elements of truth as well as elements of a convenient excuse.
Of course, the answer could be more straightforward: it might be
part of a disinformation campaign.92
While there is probably some nascent interest group activity in
North Korea, it is unclear the extent to which this is manifest: if this
takes the shape of factions that form around particular individuals;
kinship constellations; opinion groupings, overt or otherwise; and/or
loose groupings of former classmates or army buddies, for example.
Albright relates that Kim told her there was a “fifty-fifty” split
within the military over whether or not to improve relations with
the United States. as well as opposition from within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.93
The bottom line is that everyone who dabbles in the study of
North Korean elite politics is engaged in speculation. But under the
circumstances, informed speculation is a necessary evil. If factions
or opinion groupings are present in Pyongyang, they would seem
to be quite limited. Thus, Adrian Buzo’s assessment of 6 years ago
still seems apropos in North Korea today: “There is no evidence to
suggest that competitive factional activity, whether based on sectoral,
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policy, or personality grounds, has been significant under the
Kimist personal autocracies.”94 If it were otherwise, significant elite
defections would probably not be occurring. That these defections
are happening indicates that senior officials have concluded that
the current political environment does not allow for open dissent or
debate about policy direction. Instead of feeling able to speak up and
“voice” their opinions, these elites are choosing the “exit” option.95
According to Hwang Jong Yop: “. . . [A]s a dictator he [Kim] has
excellent ability. He can organize people so they can’t move, can’t do
anything, and he can keep them under his ideology. As far as I know,
the present North Korean dictatorial system is the most precise and
thorough in history.”96
Monopolistic Control of the Coercive Apparatus.
Under Kim Il Sung, the coercive apparatus was extremely effective, and by the 1960s completely under the control of the dictator.
Kim could purge at will those individuals deemed disloyal, their
families, and their networks of supporters. The coercive apparatus
comprises not just the military, but the militia, public security
(police), secret police, courts, and system of gulags. Reportedly, “the
Ministry of Internal Affairs was by far the largest of the government
departments in the DPRK.”97
The new Korean communist state established in the late 1940s in
Pyongyang set about establishing what Charles Armstrong called
a “regime of surveillance.”98 This included a massive network of
informants. The result was not only a coercive apparatus that was
able to penetrate virtually all spheres of society, but a populace who
were convinced that “Big Brother” was watching them constantly.
According to a defector in the early 1950s: “Where ever there were
more than two people gathered there was sure to be a spy.”99 But 50
years later, in the first decade of the 21st century, according to Oh
and Hassig, “[t]he surveillance system is not perfect.” Nevertheless,
these researchers contend that, “for the most part, the system works
well.”100
Kim Jong Il has done everything he can to ensure elite loyalty,
especially the allegiance of the KPA. Kim buys the loyalty of top
officers with gifts of luxury cars and apartments.101 The “military
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first” policy, first declared in 1997, indicates that Kim recognizes
where his most critical base of support lies. It appears that the most
important entity in North Korea is no longer the KWP but rather the
KPA. And Kim’s most important position seems to be not leader of
the KWP but chair of National Defense Commission.
Nevertheless, while the coercive apparatus appears to be loyal
to the regime, its allegiance to Kim Jong Il as an individual may not
be as rock solid as it was to his father. There have been defections
from this apparatus. Soldiers in particular appear to be extremely
loyal by most accounts, including those by defectors. The most
dedicated troops are those in Kim’s bodyguard which reportedly
number in the tens of thousands.102 However, the strength of their
loyalty appears to vary within the armed forces. There have been
defections, including some by senior military officers. There have
also been rumors of mutinies.103
Totalist Ideology.
In North Korea the common dimensions of a totalitarian ideology
are reinforced by three distinct Korean elements of the ideology:
triumphal survivalism, an ancestor cult, and wounded ultranationalism.
Totalitarian regimes espouse totalist ideologies that seem to
transform a society and people. The regime has an ambitious
program to remake man and society. This is usually articulated in
the ideology, and the regime aggressively undertakes to achieve
these ambitious goals through mass mobilization of the society.
Such efforts at mass mobilization are recognizable to students of
Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, and Pol Pot’s
Cambodia (Kampuchea). However, according to two experts, no
other regime has “placed so much emphasis on the politics of mass
mobilization” as North Korea.104
The regime quickly established mass organizations for peasants,
workers, women, and youth.105 Moreover, one should not overlook
the prime example of the armed forces as a “mass organization”
and the most readily mobilized entity of all. Mass mobilization
campaigns characterized the 1950s and 1960s, and the pattern was
only repeated in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s for key projects.106 The
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DPRK continues to emphasize mobilization in the 21st century
as it pursues policy goals. To improve the prospects for the 2005
harvest, for example, in May and June the regime drafted hundreds
of thousands of urban residents to go to the countryside and work
on irrigation projects and assist with rice transplanting.107 Similar
efforts take place each year, but the number of people mobilized in
2005 appears to be greater than in recent years. This mobilization
is accomplished through organizations that isolate them from their
families and inculcate them with regime beliefs and values. From a
very early age, children are separated from their parents for extended
periods of time: placed in day nurseries or work week nurseries.108
While at the nursery or school, or in the Young Pioneers or League
of Socialist Working Youth activities, or later in military service (for
periods as long as 10 years, during which time the many inductees
rarely, if ever, get back home to see their families), children and
young people spend prolonged periods under regime supervision
where they are taught to believe that they owe everything to Kim Il
Sung and are indoctrinated with the regime’s ideology.109
Communist ideology aims to work towards the ultimate goals
of global revolution, a classless society, and remaking human
nature. But more immediate attention focuses on strengthening the
regime through indoctrinating and controlling the “people,” closely
monitoring those of questionable background and purging “enemies
of the people.” To these ends, the population is divided into classes
(songbun): a “core class” of staunch regime supporters, a “wavering
class” of unreliables, and a “hostile class” of regime opponents.110
Those purged are either executed or sent to prisons or labor camps.
Triumphal Survivalism. This element is not unique to Korean
communism but exists in especially virulent form on the northern
portion of the peninsula. There is a firm belief that the movement
has succeeded by triumphing against all odds and that this will
continue. The leaders of the movement have led the chosen, and
together they have overcome seemingly insurmountable barriers.
No hardship is too much whether it be battling Japanese occupiers,
American invaders, or prolonged economic deprivations (what
Pyongyang cryptically refers to as the “arduous march”). Man
makes his own fate, and the dedicated individual will triumph.111
This is intimately linked to the guerrilla tradition that reinforces
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this survivalist mentality and underscores the harsh reality that
self-reliance and military might are the keys to survival. According
to Charles Armstrong: “[t]he attitudes formed out of the guerrilla
experience have profoundly influenced North Korean politics to this
day. Half a century later, North Korea was still being led by men
who were fundamentally shaped by the harsh environment of antiJapanese struggle in Manchuria.”112 The movement cannot depend
on any outside power or entity, and the only reliable guarantees for
survival are to possess adequate weaponry to defend oneself.113 No
outsider can be completely trusted, and the assumption, or at least
strong suspicion, is that everyone is out to get them. In short, a siege
mentality is pervasive.114
Dead Emperor’s Society. Pyongyang’s ideology is “neotraditionalist” in several aspects: it is backward looking rather than
forward looking, focuses on reverence for and obedience to elders
and superiors, and makes the supreme leader the personification of
the nation.115 The focus is on a nation-wide cult of the ancestor—the
deceased patriarch, the founder of the dynasty: Kim Il Sung. Reverence
for the departed leader is made synonymous with the loyalty to
the current leader (his son) and the cause of nationalism. There is a
consuming focus on building, maintaining, and worshiping portraits,
monuments, and edifices to the departed leader. And all current
national projects are followed to glorify his legacy. The calendar is
replete with remembering and celebrating the past: Kim Il Sung’s
birthday (April 15) and anniversaries of the founding of the party
(October 10), the army (February 8), National Day (September 9),
and major accomplishments of the regime. For example, on October
10, 2005, North Korea focused much attention toward celebrating
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the KWP.
The reverence for the deceased leader is a latter day form of
traditional (Confucian) ancestor worship focused around a cult of
the founding emperor of the dynasty.116 Kim Il Sung’s birthday—
April 15—is celebrated every year. Moreover, starting in the mid1990s, the years were renumbered to commemorate the year of the
Kim dynasty. For example, 2006 is Juche Year 95. There are heavy
religious overtones in the rituals and ceremony that come with it.
Kim Jong Il gains legitimacy by being seen to do his filial duty to
follow through on the wishes of his deceased father on issues such
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as unification. He also probably strongly believes that he is dutifully
implementing his father’s wishes.117
Kim Il Sung is depicted as personifying the revolutionary struggle
of the Korean people for independence, unification, and respect.118
The message drummed home is: Kim and his son are synonymous
with the people. The ideology has some strong corporeal overtones:
the leader is brain or head on the body of the nation, and people are
other organs. The body cannot live or function without the brain.
Therefore, without the Kim family, there would be no past, no
present, and certainly no future.
As a result of this ideological indoctrination, North Korea is home
to probably the most oppressive personality cult in the world.119
Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy derived directly from his status as the son
of Kim Il Sung, as being the greatest disciple of his father and the
twin ideologies of Kim Il Sungism and Juche. Everyone wears Kim
Il Sung lapel pins, and his portrait is everywhere. There are also
statues and shrines, including the ancestral home in Mangyongdae.
Songs and poems glorify him. North Koreans of all ages spend hours
studying his life and teachings. According to Helen-Louise Hunter:
“The most distinguishing feature about the Kim Cult, then, is not
its more extreme outward manifestations . . . but the intensity of the
people’s feelings.” There may be “contrived displays of emotions
and feigned dedication” in North Korea, but “the overwhelming
evidence” suggests a very real and “strong emotional attachment to
Kim [Il Sung].”120
Indeed, the regime relies so heavily on the Kim family for its
legitimacy that it is difficult to imagine the existing system surviving
a renunciation of Kim Il Sung and/or the toppling of Kim Jong Il.
Pyongyang’s civilian and military elites almost certainly consider
major change unthinkable if they are to retain their positions of power
and privilege. Indoctrination stresses the centrality of the family as
a unique “revolutionary” multi-generational clan whose patriotism
and heroic exploits date back to 1866 against the U.S. vessel General
Sherman.121 This aspect is acknowledged by experts who label North
Korea as a “Kimist system” or the “Kim Family Regime.”122
Wounded Ultra-Nationalism. The third component of North Korea’s
ideology is a deeply scarred extreme nationalism. Koreans are very
much influenced by centuries of being mercilessly exploited by great
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powers, and by dint of geography serving as a battleground or invasion
route for surrounding states. A history of invasion and oppression
by China, Japan, and, more recently, by devastation wrought by
the U.S. military during the Korean War, has combined to make the
Pyongyang regime obsessed with righting the indignities suffered by
the Korean people. The “never again” mantra of the Jewish Diaspora,
when seeking to move beyond the horror of the Holocaust, would
find significant resonance with many Korean inhabitants, both north
and south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In contrast, however,
while the Jews have a homeland within the borders of a single state,
the ancestral Korean homeland remains politically divided. Because
of this history and the unresolved matter of unification, Koreans are
ultra-sensitive toward perceived slights and insults to their national
pride. While Pyongyang’s periodic insistence that the statements
of foreign leaders or officials that disparage the regime have “hurt
the feelings” of the North Korean people provides useful fodder
for propaganda and convenient excuses for postponing talks, this
rhetoric may also reflect wounded nationalism.
In this context, the propaganda display arranged for the visiting
U.S. Secretary of State in 2000, described by Albright as resembling
“an Olympics opening ceremony on steroids,”123 becomes more
comprehensible. The purpose of the elaborately choreographed
display was not only to glorify the regime and feed the ego of its
supreme dictator, but also to stress the power and resolve of the
North Korean people in the face of a hostile and dangerous world.
Nevertheless, it is possible that Kim wanted to stage an entertaining
and memorable performance for his guest and did not necessarily
intend to hammer home a particular message—there was simply
no time to come up with a new program.124 This becomes quite a
plausible explanation if one recognizes that North Korea does not
have much that can impress foreign dignitaries. Other than displays
of actual military power—conventional or WMD—what else, beyond
examples of mass mobilization and synchronization, does Kim have
to offer?
This wounded nationalism is encapsulated in the ideology of
Juche. Usually translated as “self-reliance,” it is better understood as
“self-determination.” Many analysts and observers are hard pressed
to understand what it really means—how to define it and explain it.
29

As a result, many end up either getting frustrated and/or claiming
it is simply mindless mumbo jumbo that the regime finds useful to
cover up its contradictions and inconsistencies. To better appreciate
Juche, it might be best viewed, as Bruce Cumings suggests, as “a
state of mind.” Cumings elaborates: “The term literally means being
subjective where Korean matters are concerned, putting Korea first
in everything.”125 The term, Cumings contends, is “untranslatable.”
Given wounded Korean nationalism and these insights, perhaps
Juche is best defined as putting “Korea first (in everything).”126
It is not clear to what extent that this ideology of socialism,
combined with triumphal survivalism, ancestor worship, and
wounded ultra-nationalism, has been undermined by foreign and/
or economic crises.
Information Control.
Totalitarian regimes seek to exercise total control over information
and all forms of media. Through this control, they can engage in
brainwashing or indoctrination on a mass scale. In the era of Kim Il
Sung, this control was far easier to enforce than it is in the era of Kim
Jong Il. Rapid advances in information technology have made it far
more challenging for a totalitarian regime to seal off its population
from external sources of information. Nevertheless, under the
circumstances, Pyongyang has done a credible job of keeping most
people almost completely reliant on the official North Korean media
for information and suspicion of any outside propaganda from the
United States or South Korea.
Televisions and radio sets in North Korean households are fixed
so that they can only receive one approved station, and most people
have no access to external print media. But even if they get access to
South Korean or Chinese newspapers and magazines, their ability to
read these materials is hampered.127 While the North Korean populace
has a high rate of basic literacy with at least 7 years of education,
many cannot read Chinese characters, only the indigenous Hangul
syllabary.128 Decades ago Pyongyang purged its writing system of
Chinese characters that are still used in South Korean and Japanese
publications.129
Prior to the 1990s, North Korea was quite tightly sealed off
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from information about and exposure to the outside world. The
emergence of a severe food crisis in North Korea in the early
1990s triggered a massive human flow back and forth across the
North Korea-China border. This enabled as many as hundreds of
thousands of North Koreans to get firsthand information about and
experience with the outside world that may have conflicted with
or contradicted information they had received from official North
Korean sources.130 Before this, most ordinary citizens of the DPRK
had no opportunity to go abroad except as contract manual laborers
in places such as logging camps in the Russian Far East.131 Otherwise,
travel or temporary residence abroad was restricted to elites such as
diplomats or soldiers serving as advisors or body guards to Third
World dictators.
In addition to the back and forth to China, there has been some
tightly controlled interaction with relatives from South Korea for a
small number of DPRK citizens, as well as limited exposure to foreign
tourists. Also potentially significant has been extended exposure in
recent years to foreign aid workers who were able to visit significant
areas of North Korea, sometimes unescorted.132
We know that there has been increased use of cellular telephones
and viewing of video cassettes in North Korea in the past several
years. Perhaps thousands of cell phones are now in use. These are
used mainly to conduct business along the border with China,
but they also permit communication between family members in
North Korea and those in China and South Korea. According to one
estimate, “about one-third of the defectors in South Korea regularly
talk to family members back in North Korea.”133 Video cassette tapes
are smuggled in from South Korea and played on video cassette
recorders (VCRs) bought on the black market in China. As a result,
North Koreas are watching bootleg tapes of South Korean soap
operas that show the prosperity and modernity south of the DMZ.
These tapes have reportedly spread across North Korea, whereas
cell phones only work in certain parts of the country.134
These developments certainly have the potential to undermine
complete regime control of information, and Pyongyang has taken
these developments extremely seriously.135 There have been periodic
crackdowns on both cell phone usage and illicit video viewings.

31

For example, following the mysterious explosion at a train yard in
Ryongchon on the main rail line between Pyongyang and Beijing
on April 22, 2004, the regime severely curtailed cell phone use and
more closely monitored wireless communications.136 Although there
is no evidence that this was anything but an accidental explosion
of chemical fertilizer, it appears that the regime believed this could
have been an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Il whose train
traveled through the station 8 hours earlier on a return trip from
China. There was concern that cell phones may have been used to
plan the incident and/or even detonate the explosion. As of early
2005, frequency blocking devices have also been activated in cities
near the border with China, and executions of cell phone users have
been reported.137
The regime is alarmed over the proliferation of illicit videos and
the fads they spawn in South Korean slang, fashions (including
hairstyles), and goods.138 Tactics used by the regime include
surrounding a neighborhood one evening, shutting off the power,
and then going dwelling to dwelling to see what tape is lodged
inside the VCR.139 We also know that there is clandestine listening to
foreign radio broadcasts from South Korea and Voice of America by
some in North Korea.140
Social scientists refer to a dynamic called the “spiral of silence”
that is operative in environments such as North Korea where there
is strict control of information and heavy indoctrination reinforced
by people’s fear of the consequences of publicly challenging or
questioning the official line.141 In such a situation, a person thinks
that he or she is the only person who has doubts and feels guilty,
unpatriotic, or deviant. Such are the results of “brainwashing.”
Because no one else expresses similar feelings, the person believes
he/she is alone in feeling this way. As a result of this (as well as out
of a fear of being punished for having bad thoughts), the individual
remains silent or shares their doubts with perhaps one other highly
trusted friend or loved one.
However, once someone speaks out publicly with their doubts
or criticism, the spiral of silence is broken and others realize there
are not alone their supposed heterodox thoughts. Once the spiral is
broken, the system can begin to unravel fairly quickly with dramatic
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results. The results can be especially dramatic once people realize
they can escape punishment for speaking out, and there is safety
in numbers: suddenly the regime is seriously threatened, such as
in China in 1989, or can even collapse as in the revolutions of 1989
in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most shocking illustration of the
end of the spiral silence is in Romania in December 1989. It began
with a small group of hecklers booing at a Bucharest rally where
Nicolae Ceausescu was speaking which was being broadcast live
on December 21, 1989. The heckling quickly snowballed, and a day
later Ceausescu and his wife were arrested and executed a few days
afterwards.142
Condition of Terror.
One characteristic in the mindset of leaders in totalitarian
regimes is that they tend to be extremely paranoid. Because of their
experiences in the conspiratorial activities involved in the business
of making revolution (i.e., seizing and holding power), they are
intimately familiar with how schemers and putchists operate and
are overly sensitized to potential threats. They tend to assume all
rhetoric or activity even vaguely critical is directed at undermining
or overthrowing the regime, even when elites or ordinary people
express legitimate grievances or frustration with no intention
beyond resolving their specific issue. Moreover, even if the protests
are judged to be relatively harmless, they are usually ruthlessly
suppressed for fear that they might inspire others. The automatic
response to dissent is a swift iron fist to make an example of the
perpetrators and to send the message that such actions will not be
tolerated. These examples and the presumption that a contemplated
act of protest or dissent will be crushed immediately instill a climate
of fear as people become apprehensive of a knock at the door in the
middle of the night. Fear becomes so pervasive that people believe
that the authorities see and hear everything: the perception that “Big
Brother” is watching you.143
In addition, people fear for the consequences of what one person’s
perceived misdeed might hold for a whole family. Purges in North
Korea involve not just an individual but his or her entire family
being sent to the gulag. The result is a major deterrent to wrongdoing
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because of the knowledge that the punishment will not just be
inflicted on the individual but upon his/her extended family.144 The
climate of terror is instilled not just by the visible elements of the
coercive apparatus—the public security bureau, the military, and
the courts—but also by a fear of being informed on by a colleague, a
friend, or even a loved one.145
The climate of terror is still quite pervasive in 21st century North
Korea, although it has weakened to the extent that it has not dissuaded
hundreds of thousands from traveling to China and thousands from
attempting to defect to South Korea via a third country (usually China).
The motivations appear to be the harshness of economic conditions
in the country of the past 2 decades or fear of continued persecution
among those marked for life as troublemakers or unreliables. This is
the primary reason given by Kang Chol Hwan for his defection as
recounted in his memoirs, The Aquariums of Pyongyang. Kang knew
that he was under surveillance and concluded that it was only a
matter of time before he was rearrested and sent back to the gulag.
Nevertheless, the climate of fear in North Korea has weakened to
the extent that bribery and corruption are all pervasive. Functionaries
and officials readily accept bribes to dispense goods, issue documents,
and tolerate travel without permits. And regime informants, border
guards, and train conductors routinely accept bribes to look the
other way.146 There are also reports that the punishment of one’s
entire family for the transgressions of one member may now be less
draconian.147
Centralized Economy.
In a totalitarian state, the regime attempts to control most, if
not all, economic activity. In communist variants of totalitarianism,
central planning is deemed essential to ensure rapid and coordinated
economic development. Normally this entails multiyear plans
(usually in increments of 5 years). Central planners decide what is
to be produced, the quantity, and the price. All major commodities
and foodstuffs are allocated by the state. Most basic necessities and
highly desirable goods, including food and consumer items tend to
be rationed and distributed through a network of the regime. The
result is that individuals come to depend on the regime for most
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daily necessities. Often the system does not provide enough goods
to satisfy demand. An unpredictable supply of goods leads people
to hoard items as a precaution. The Centrally Planned Economy
(CPE) and the rational reaction of consumers virtually guarantee
that demand will outstrip supply. Therefore economist Janos Kornai
has dubbed the system “the shortage economy.”148 Because of the
inefficiencies and bottlenecks inherent in the system, an informal or
“second” economy (aka “black market”) develops to satisfy people’s
wants. The result is corruption or what communist regimes tend to
call “economic crimes.”
A CPE emerged in North Korea in March 1946 with the
establishment of an “economic planning bureau.” Within 12
months (February 1947), a “National Economic Rehabilitation and
Development” blueprint had been adopted.149 In the era of Kim Il
Sung, the CPE certainly was not perfect, but it did function reasonably
well to the extent that North Korea enjoyed respectable economic
growth, and DPRK citizens enjoyed a decent standard of living. By
the 1960s, North Koreans actually may have had a better standard
of living than their South Korean cousins. And the central planning
bureaucrats in Pyongyang appear to have been more successful
than their counterparts in other communist states at collectivizing
agriculture without precipitating famine. The economic system,
while it experienced increasing problems in the 1970s and 1980s,
could count on loans and subsidized fuel and other assistance from
fraternal socialist states to mitigate the impact of these.
By the 1990s, however, in the final years of Kim Il Sung’s life,
these loans and subsidies dried up, and Moscow and other capitals
insisted that Pyongyang pay with hard currency for trade items. In the
mid-1990s, as food situation became more desperate, people began
to migrate in search of food. Hunger and malnourishment became
starvation. The famine dramatically demonstrated the weakening
of the regime: the breakdown of its food distribution system. In
other words, the regime proved unable to ensure its populace was
fed, and people had to adopt survival strategies by relying on their
own initiative and ingenuity.150 However, food aid from overseas is
depicted as a gift—the manifestation of a latter-day tribute system
whereby Kim Jong Il receives offerings from afar as tokens of the
esteemed and exalted status in which he is held in the world.
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What were the causes of the famine and how can one assess its
impact? There is actually widespread consensus among experts
about the causes. But, it is worthwhile to note that North Korean
agriculture is quite impressive in a number of respects. First,
collectivization was achieved in the late 1950s without triggering the
kind of major famine that the same process did in places such as
the former Soviet Union and China.151 Moreover, North Korea is a
highly urbanized and industrial country, with only approximately
one-third of its populace being engaged in full-time agriculture.152
Having said this, the impact of the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (1989-91) that resulted in the
swift and sudden dismantlement of Pyongyang’s economic support
network made a major crisis in North Korean agriculture inevitable.
The DPRK heavily relied on subsidized inputs, especially petroleum,
to operate its entire economy. But the end of this support hit the
agricultural sector especially hard. North Korea’s agriculture suffers
from many of the same systemic distortions and inefficiencies
as other communist countries where the agrarian sector has been
collectivized. The choice of crops and farming techniques is often not
appropriate to the soil, topography, or climatic conditions. The results
are poor yields, depleted soil, and serious land erosion. In addition,
agriculture is “input intensive,” requiring large amounts of fuel,
fertilizer, and equipment to keep it functioning. Virtually all aspects
are highly mechanized and depend on chemical fertilizer, and this
requires a constant infusion of energy resources. Since North Korea
is not an oil producer, it depends totally on imported petroleum to
power tractors, irrigation pumps, and factories producing chemical
fertilizer. Certainly coal is mined domestically and can be used for
some of the DPRK’s energy needs, but oil seems indispensable.153
The famine was exacerbated by severe weather and flooding, but
the situation became chronic because the regime refused to institute
systemic changes or reform. Instead, Pyongyang looked to foreign
governments and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to provide
famine relief. Starting in 1995, the regime adopted an explicit aidbased strategy, and the following year a variety of NGOs were
permitted to operate in the country. Significantly, for the most part,
the regime took responsibility for distributing the aid through its
own Public Distribution System (PDS).154
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But rumors of the complete and irreversible collapse of the regime
appear to have been greatly exaggerated. In late 2005 Pyongyang
appeared to be reactivating its PDS.155 The famine appears to be
ameliorated significantly although not completely resolved. But the
regime insisted that the country has recovered from the famine, and
there is no more need for food aid. They claimed that the country
enjoyed a “bumper harvest.” Thus, the regime announced that by
the end of 2005 all foreign aid organizations must cease their food
aid projects in the country. Instead the effort should be focused on
development assistance.156 But it is not clear whether all aid groups
would be forced out, especially if they officially switch from food aid
to development assistance.157
Why did the regime take this step? First, it is very likely that the
regime wanted to reassert control over the country. Second, the regime
wanted foreign aid workers out of the country. They are viewed as
negative and possible dangerous influences on the people of North
Korea. The regime wants to avoid the perception among the people
that the country depends on foreign assistance.158 Third, the food
situation has improved considerably although problems abound,
including widespread malnutrition. According to United Nations
(UN) estimates, 7 percent of North Koreans are still starving, and more
than one-third of the populace is “chronically malnourished.”159 The
regime may be confident that agriculture is on the mend. Whether
this is so, Pyongyang is now receiving considerable aid from China
and South Korea, assistance that comes without many restrictions,
or controls, or intrusive foreign personnel. This kind of hands-off aid
from neighbors is much preferred to that provided by meddlesome
Western NGOs and relief agencies.
To sum up, North Korea’s CPE is still in place and functioning.
While the famine has proved highly challenging to the regime, its
performance and response are not so different to those of CPEs in
other communist regimes. The distortions and inefficiencies could
be compensated for and/or overlooked until the collapse of Soviet
bloc aid in the late 1980s. This dealt a body blow to Pyongyang’s
economy generally, and in particular savaged its “input-intensive”
agricultural sector. The response to the famine this triggered was
not systemic reform or even serious introspection, but ad hoc efforts
to mitigate the disaster through foreign aid and reform around
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the edges. The latter adaptations included tolerating private food
markets and raising prices.160
CONCLUSION
North Korea is an eroding totalitarian regime that has existed for
approximately 4 decades. While totalitarianism is a powerful and
intimidating system, it places tremendous strain on a state and a
society—demanding constant activity and mobilization of personnel
and exploitation of resources. The costs of maintaining heightened
ideological indoctrination, an ever-vigilant coercive apparatus,
and a large national defense organization are high and ultimately
debilitating. To maintain these for decades results in fatigue and
burnout.161 Eventually leaders and followers reach a point where
both are physically and mentally exhausted, and the country’s
infrastructure and resources become devastated. North Korea’s elite
and ordinary people appear to be approaching this point. But this
fatigue and burnout does not appear to produce much in the way of
protest or dissent, let alone revolt; most likely the majority of people
in North Korea are simply too tired to do much more than focus their
time and energy on providing the basic necessities for their families
and a few of life’s luxuries for special occasions.
While the regime is still ruled by an absolute dictator who leads a
ruling party-military-state with a continued monopoly of the coercive
apparatus, there has been some slippage in the first of these areas and
other features have eroded noticeably. First, Kim Jong Il, although
virtually an absolute dictator, appears to take into account the
opinions of others the way his father did not. And ideology no longer
appears to be so focused on transforming the state and society and
more on the instrumental goals of economic recovery, development,
and firming up regime power. While a condition of terror remains
palpable, it is no longer all pervasive, and individuals are able to
navigate or circumvent the system without fearing that they face
dire consequences. As a result of the shift in ideology and alleviation
of climate of terror, the regime has become “corrupted”—literally as
bribery is rampant, and figuratively as the Leninist regime, what Ken
Jowitt would characterize as “neo-traditionalist.”162 Meanwhile, the
Stalinist centrally planned economy has been eroded seriously, and
38

the monopoly of mass communication has loosened significantly.
The regime has attempted to repair the latter two elements, but it is
not clear to what extent this will be successful.
The regime appears to be stable and not on the brink of collapse.
While it is difficult to speculate about the longevity of North Korea
as a political entity, it is more manageable to forecast the future
of totalitarianism in the DPRK. Totalitarian regimes rarely endure
longer than several decades and almost never survive the passing
of the absolute dictator. In fact, Pyongyang is unique in that it is the
only totalitarian regime to have weathered a leadership transition.
Indeed, North Korea is the world’s “longest lasting totalitarian
regime, having spanned some 4 decades and surviving generational
leadership succession.”163 While Kim Jong Il’s party-military-state
faces numerous challenges, perhaps none is more daunting than the
succession question. Kim probably has at most 10-15 years in which
to pave the way for one of his offspring to succeed him. If he lives
long enough, it is possible he could be successful. What is less likely
is that totalitarianism could survive another leadership transition.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the status and fate of Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime over the next 10 years or so will come in
how the arrangements for the succession to Kim Jong Il are handled.
Is there evidence that a particular individual is being groomed to
succeed Kim? The answer appears to be “yes.”164 Some other key
indicators to monitor are signs of dissent among elites and masses,
especially fissures that might occur within the party or military. By
carefully charting trends, observers can make it less likely that they
will be caught off guard by the actions of North Korea’s leader or
changes in its political system.
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